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Abstract
The sequential allocation protocol is a simple and popular mechanism to allocate indi-
visible goods, in which the agents take turns to pick the items according to a predefined
sequence. While this protocol is not strategy-proof, it has been shown recently that finding
a successful manipulation for an agent is an NP-hard problem [ABLM17]. Conversely, it
is also known that finding an optimal manipulation can be solved in polynomial time in a
few cases: if there are only two agents or if the manipulator has a binary or a lexicographic
utility function. In this work, we take a parameterized approach to provide several new
complexity results on this manipulation problem. More precisely, we give a complete pic-
ture of its parameterized complexity w.r.t. the following three parameters: the number n
of agents, the number µ(a1) of times the manipulator a1 picks in the picking sequence, and
the maximum range rgmax of an item. This third parameter is a correlation measure on
the preference rankings of the agents. In particular, we show that the problem of finding
an optimal manipulation can be solved in polynomial time if n or µ(a1) is a constant, and
that it is fixed-parameter tractable w.r.t. rgmax and n + µ(a1). Interestingly enough, we
show that w.r.t. the single parameters n and µ(a1) it is W[1]-hard. Moreover, we provide an
integer program and a dynamic programming scheme to solve the manipulation problem and
we show that a single manipulator can increase the utility of her bundle by a multiplicative
factor which is at most 2.
1 Introduction
Allocating resources to a set of agents in an efficient and fair manner is one of the most fun-
damental problems in computational social choice. One challenging case is the allocation of
indivisible items [BCM16, BEF03, LMMS04], e.g., allocating players to teams. To address this
problem, the sequential allocation mechanism has lately received increasing attention in the
AI literature [AWX15, AKWX16, BL11, KNW13, KNWX13, LS12]. This mechanism works as
follows: at each time step an agent, selected according to a predefined sequence, is allowed to
pick one item among the remaining ones. Such a protocol has many desirable qualities: it is
simple, it can be run both in a centralized and in a decentralized way, and agents do not have
to submit cardinal utilities. For these reasons, sequential allocation is used in several real life
applications, as for instance by several professional sports associations [BSJ79] to organize their
draft systems (e.g., the annual draft of the National Basketball Association in the US), and by
the Harvard Business School to allocate courses to students [BC07].
Unfortunately, it is well known that the sequential allocation protocol is not strategy-proof.
Stated otherwise, an agent can obtain a better allocation by not obeying her preferences, and
this might lead to unfair allocations for the truthful agents [BL11]. Such a drawback has
motivated the algorithmic study of several issues related to strategic behaviors in the sequential
allocation setting, the most important one being the computation of a “successful” manipulation.
Hopefully, if finding a successful manipulation is computationally too difficult, then agents may
be inclined to behave truthfully [Wal16].
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Related work on strategic behaviors in the sequential allocation setting. Aziz et
al. [AGW17] studied the sequential allocation setting by treating it as a one shot game. They
notably designed a linear-time algorithm to compute a pure Nash equilibrium and a polynomial-
time algorithm to compute an optimal Stackelberg strategy when there are two agents, a leader
and a follower, and the follower has a constant number of distinct values for the items. If the
sequential allocation setting is seen as finite repeated game with perfect information, Kalinowski
et al. [KNWX13] showed that the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium can be computed
in linear time when there are two players. However, with more agents, the authors showed that
computing one of the possibly exponentially many equilibria is PSPACE-hard.
Several papers focused on the complexity of finding a successful manipulation for a given
agent, also called manipulator. Bouveret and Lang [BL11] showed that determining if there exists
a strategy for the manipulator to get a specific set of items can be done in polynomial time.
Moreover, Aziz et al. [ABLM17] showed that finding if there exists a successful manipulation,
whatever the utility function of the manipulator, is a polynomial-time problem. Conversely, the
same authors showed that determining an optimal manipulation (for a specific utility function)
is an NP-hard problem. Bouveret and Lang [BL14] provided further hardness results for finding
an optimal manipulation for the cases of non-additive preferences and coalitions of manipulators.
On the other hand, finding an optimal manipulation can be performed in polynomial time if
the manipulator has lexicographic or binary utilities [ABLM17, BL14] or if there are only two
agents [BL14]. Tominaga et al. [TTY16] further showed that finding an optimal manipulation is
a polynomial-time problem when there are only two agents and the picking sequence is composed
of a sequence of randomly generated rounds. More precisely, in each round, both agents get to
pick one item and a coin flip determines who picks first.
Our contribution. We tackle the parameterized complexity of manipulating sequential allo-
cations, and provide a complete picture of the problem w.r.t. the following three parameters:
the number n of agents, the number µ(a1) of items the manipulator gets to pick in the allocation
process, and the maximum range rgmax of an item, a parameter measuring how close the pref-
erence rankings of the agents are. In particular, using a novel dynamic programming algorithm,
we show that the problem is in XP with respect to n, that is it can be solved in polynomial time
if n is constant, and it is Fixed-Parameter Tractable (FPT) w.r.t. rgmax. Moreover, we show
that it is in XP w.r.t. µ(a1) and FPT w.r.t. to the sum n+µ(a1). Interestingly enough, we prove
that the problem is W[1]-hard w.r.t. to the single parameters n and µ(a1). As a consequence,
our XP results are both tight. Table 1 summarizes our results. Lastly, we provide an integer
programming formulation of the problem and show that the manipulator cannot increase the
utility of her bundle by a multiplicative factor greater than or equal to 2, this bound being tight.
Table 1: Our parameterized complexity results on the problem of manipulating sequential allocations.
Parameter n µ(a1) n+ µ(a1) rg
max
Results In XP and W[1]-hard In XP and W[1]-hard In FPT In FPT
Theorems 1 and 6 Theorem 5 Theorem 2 Theorem 4
Two results presented in this paper (Theorems 1 and 7) have independently been found by
Xiao and Ling [XL19]. Indeed, they present another XP algorithm for parameter n as well as the
same bound on the increase in utility that a manipulator can obtain. Interestingly, the proofs
and the insights on the picking sequence allocation process that are used are quite different.
2 Setting and Notations
We consider a set A = {a1, . . . , an} of n agents and a set I = {i1, . . . , im} of m items. A
preference profile P = {≻a1 , . . . ,≻an} describes the preferences of the agents. More precisely,
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P is a collection of rankings such that ranking ≻a specifies the preferences of agent a over the
items in I. The items are allocated to the agents according to the following sequential allocation
procedure: at each time step, a picking sequence π ∈ Am specifies an agent who gets to pick an
item within the remaining ones. Put another way, π(1) picks first, then π(2) picks second, and so
forth. We assume that agents behave greedily by choosing at each time step their preferred item
within the remaining ones. If we view sequential allocation as a centralized protocol, then all
agents report their preference rankings to a central authority which mimics this picking process.
In the following, w.l.o.g. we use this centralized viewpoint where agents have to report their
preference rankings. This sequential process leads to an allocation that we denote by φ. More
formally, φ is a function such that φ(a) is the set of items that agent a has obtained at the end
of the sequential allocation process.
Example 1 (Adapted from Example 1 in [ABLM17]). For the sake of illustration, we consider
an instance with 3 agents and 4 items, i.e., A = {a1, a2, a3} and I = {i1, i2, i3, i4}. The
preferences of the agents are described by the following profile:
a1 : i1 ≻ i2 ≻ i3 ≻ i4
a2 : i3 ≻ i4 ≻ i1 ≻ i2
a3 : i1 ≻ i2 ≻ i3 ≻ i4
and the picking sequence is π = (a1, a2, a3, a1). Then, a1 will first pick i1, then a2 will pick i3, a3
will pick i2, and lastly a1 will pick i4. Hence, the resulting allocation is given by φ(a1) = {i1, i4},
φ(a2) = {i3} and φ(a3) = {i2}.
The allocation φ is completely determined by the picking sequence π and the preference
profile P . Notably, if one of the agents reports a different preference ranking, she may obtain
a different set of items. This different set may even be more desirable to her. Consequently,
agents may have an incentive to misreport their preferences.
Example 2 (Example 1 continued). Assume now that agent a1 reports the preference ranking
i3 ≻ i2 ≻ i1 ≻ i4. Then she obtains the set of items φ(a1) = {i2, i3}. This set of items may be
more desirable to a1 than {i1, i4} if for instance items i1, i2 and i3 are almost as desirable as
one another, but are all three much more desirable than i4.
In this work, we study this type of manipulation. We will assume that agent a1 is the
manipulator and that all other agents behave truthfully. Although the agents are asked to
report ordinal preferences, we will assume a standard assumption in the literature that a1 has
underlying additive utilities for the items. More formally, the preferences of a1 over items in I
are described by a set of positive values U = {u(i)|i ∈ I} such that i ≻a1 j implies u(i) > u(j).
The utility of a set of items S is then obtained by summation, i.e., u(S) =
∑
i∈S u(i). We will
denote by ≻T the truthful preference ranking of a1, and by φ≻ the allocation obtained if agent
a1 reports the preference ranking ≻. Moreover, we will denote by uT the value u(φ≻T (a1)) which
is the utility value of a1’s allocation when she behaves truthfully. We will say that a preference
ranking ≻ is a successful manipulation if a1 prefers φ≻(a1) to φ≻T (a1), i.e., if u(φ≻(a1)) > uT .
Hence, the objective for the manipulator is to find a successful manipulation ≻ maximizing
u(φ≻(a1)). We are now ready to define formally the problem of Manipulating a Sequential
Allocation process, called ManipSA.
ManipSA
Input: A set A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} of n agents where a1 is the manipulator, a set I =
{i1, . . . , im} of m items, a picking sequence π, a preference profile P and a set U of utility
values for a1.
Find: A preference ranking ≻ maximizing u(φ≻(a1)).
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The ManipSA problem is known to be NP -hard [ABLM17]. In this work, we will address
this optimization problem from a parameterized complexity point of view. We will be mostly
interested in three types of parameters: the number of agents, the number of items that an agent
gets to pick, and the range of the items. While the number of agents n is already clear, let us
define the other parameters more formally. We denote by µ(a) the number of items that agent
a gets to choose in π and by µmax the maximum of these values, i.e., µmax = max{µ(a)|a ∈ A}.
Let rka(i) denote the rank of item i in the preference ranking of agent a. Then, we define the
range rg(i) of an item i as:
rg(i) = max
a∈A\{a1}
rka(i)− min
a∈A\{a1}
rka(i) + 1.
Note that we define the range of an item using only non-manipulators. The maximum range of
an item rgmax is then defined as maxi∈I rg(i).
Let us give some intuitions on parameters µ(a1) and rg
max. In the ManipSA problem, µ(a1)
can be seen as a budget parameter for the manipulator. Intuitively, the larger the value of
µ(a1), the more she can manipulate. It is also the size of a feasible solution, i.e., the size of
the bundle a1 will get. Interestingly, in real-life applications, µ(a1) can be much smaller than
|I| and even much smaller than |A|. For these reasons, µ(a1) is an interesting parameter to
study in the ManipSA problem. On the other hand, parameter rgmax measures the correlation
between the preferences of the non-manipulators. If rgmax = 1 (its minimal possible value),
then all non-manipulators have the same preference ranking. In this case, the manipulation
problem becomes easy to solve, as all non-manipulators can be treated as a single agent and
the case of two agents is known to be polynomial-time solvable. This simple insight can let us
hope that the manipulation problem remains tractable if this parameter is small. An important
motivation behind parameter rgmax is that, in practice, the preferences of different agents are
often correlated.
3 Positive Parameterized Complexity Results on the ManipSA
Problem
To solve the ManipSA problem, one can simply try the m! possible preference rankings and see
which ones yield the maximum utility value. However, a more clever approach uses the following
result.
Fact 1 (From Propositions 7 and 8 in [BL11]). Given a specific set of items S, it is possible to
determine in polynomial time whether there exists a preference ranking ≻ such that S ⊆ φ≻(a1).
In such case, it is also easy to compute such a ranking.
Hence, one can try all the
(
m
µ(a1)
)
possible sets of µ(a1) items to determine which is the best
one that a1 can get. This approach shows that the ManipSA problem is in XP w.r.t. parameter
µ(a1).
Example 3 (Example 1 continued). As in this example µ(a1) = 2, a1 just has to determine
which one of the
(4
2
)
following sets she must obtain: {i1, i2}, {i1, i3}, {i1, i4}, {i2, i3}, {i2, i4}, {i3, i4}.
To obtain further positive results, we first design a dynamic programming scheme. We will
then explain how this scheme entails several positive parameterized complexity results.
3.1 A Dynamic Programming Scheme
Our dynamic programming approach considers pairs (k, S) where S ⊆ I and k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , µ(a1)}.
In a state characterized by the pair (k, S), we know that the items in S have been picked by
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some agents in A as well as k other items that have been picked by agent a1. However, while
the items in S are clearly identified, the identities of these k other items are unspecified.
Given a pair (k, S), the number of items that have already been picked is |S|+k. Hence, the
next picker is π(|S|+k+1). Let us denote this agent by a. If a = a1, i.e., she is the manipulator,
then she will pick one more item within the set I \S and we move to state (k+1, S). Otherwise,
let b(a, S) denote the preferred item of agent a within the set I \S. Then, two cases are possible:
• In the first case, b(a, S) has already been picked by agent a1. Then, we move to state
(k− 1, S ∪{b(a, S)}). Note that this is only possible if k was greater than or equal to one.
• Otherwise b(a, S) is picked by agent a and we move to state (k, S ∪ {b(a, S)}).
Let us denote by V (k, S) the maximal utility that the manipulator can get from items in
I \ S starting from state (k, S). Then the value of an optimal manipulation is given by V (k =
0, S = ∅). From the previous analysis, function V verifies the following dynamic programming
equations:
V (k, S)=V (k + 1, S) if π(|S|+ k + 1) = a1 (1)
V (k = 0, S)=V (k, S∪{b(a, S)}) ifπ(|S| + k + 1)=a 6=a1 (2)
V (k > 0, S)=max
(
V (k − 1, S ∪ {b(a, S)}) + u(b(a, S)),
V (k, S ∪ {b(a, S)})
)
if π(|S|+ k + 1) = a 6= a1 (3)
where the termination is guaranteed by the fact that V (k, S) =
∑
i∈I\S u(i) when |S|+ k = m.
Equations 1-3 induce a directed acyclic state graph Gdp = (Vdp, Adp), where Vdp is the set
of states generated from state (k = 0, S = ∅) when using these equations and the arcs in Adp
connect each state to its successor states. We will also denote by Sdp = {S|(k, S) ∈ Vdp} the set
of item-sets S that are involved in Vdp.
Notably, solving Equations 1-3 can be performed by building graph Gdp and running back-
ward induction on it (from the lastly generated states to the initial state (k = 0, S = ∅)). By
standard bookkeeping techniques one can also identify the items that are taken in an optimal
manipulation and the order in which they are taken and then recover an optimal ranking to
report (where these items are ranked first and in the same order).
Example 4 (Example 1 continued). Let us illustrate our approach on our running example.
We let u(i1) = 5, u(i2) = 4, u(i3) = 3 and u(i4) = 1. Figure 1 displays the resulting state graph
Gdp. The values of the states are given next to them and the optimal branches are displayed
with thick solid arrows. In this example, Sdp = {∅, {i3}, {i1, i3}, {i3, i4}, {i1, i2, i3}, {i1, i3, i4}}.
As we can see, the optimal choices for a1 is to first pick i3 so that i2 is still available the second
time she becomes the picker. Hence, an optimal manipulation is given by ≻= i3 ≻ i2 ≻ i1 ≻ i4
which results in an allocation φ≻(a1) = {i2, i3} with a utility of 7 whereas uT = 6.
3.2 Complexity Analysis
We now provide positive parameterized complexity results by proving several upper bounds on
|Vdp|. In fact, we will prove bounds on |Sdp| and use the observation that |Vdp| ≤ (µ(a1)+1)|Sdp| ≤
m|Sdp| as there are only µ(a1) + 1 possible values for k in a state (k, S).
The algorithm is XP w.r.t. parameter n. Let D(a, i) denote the set of items that agent
a prefers to item i, i.e., D(a, i) = {j ∈ I|j ≻a i}. Then, for any set S ⊆ I, the defini-
tion of b(a, S), which we recall is the preferred element of agent a in set I \ S implies that⋃
a∈A\{a1}
D(a, b(a, S)) ⊆ S. Let us denote by ∆ the set of item-sets for which the equality
holds, i.e., ∆ = {S ⊆ I|
⋃
a∈A\{a1}
D(a, b(a, S)) = S}. Note that a set S ∈ ∆ is completely
determined by the vector (b(a2, S), . . . , b(an, S)) and thus |∆| ≤ m
n−1. Our first key insight is
that Sdp is a subset of ∆.
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(0, ∅) 7π(1) = a1
(1, ∅) 7π(2) = a2
(1, {i3}) 6π(3) = a3
π(4) = a1
(0, {i3}) 4
(1, {i1, i3}) 5
(0, {i1, i3}) 1
(0, {i3, i4}) 4
(2, {i1, i3}) 5
(0, {i1, i2, i3}) 1
(1, {i1, i2, i3}) 1
(0, {i1, i3, i4}) 4
(1, {i1, i3, i4}) 4
a1 has picked i2, i4,
u(i2) + u(i4) = 5
a1 has picked i4,
u(i4) = 1
a1 has picked i2,
u(i2) = 4
a2 picks i3
a1 has picked i3,
u(i3) = 3
a3 picks i1
a1 has picked i1,
u(i1) = 5
a2 picks i4
a3 picks i2
a3 picks i1
Figure 1: Directed acyclic state graph Gdp in Example 1
Lemma 1. The set Sdp is a subset of ∆.
Proof. Let us show by induction that for each state (k, S) ∈ Vdp, S is in ∆. The result is true
for the initial state in which S = ∅. Assume that the result is true for a state (k, S). We show
that the result also holds for the successor states. If π(|S| + k + 1) = a1, then the successor
state is (k + 1, S) so the result is also true for this new state as S is unchanged. Otherwise, let
π(|S|+ k + 1) = a∗, then the successor states are (k, S ∪ {b(a∗, S)}) and (k − 1, S ∪ {b(a∗, S)}).
Then we have the following two inclusion relationships:
D(a∗, b(a∗, S)) ∪ {b(a∗, S)} ⊆ D(a∗, b(a∗, S ∪ {b(a∗, S)})),
∀a ∈ A \ {a1},D(a, b(a, S)) ⊆ D(a, b(a, S ∪ {b(a
∗, S)})).
These relationships imply that S ∪ {b(a∗, S)} is equal to:
⋃
a∈A\{a1}
D(a, b(a, S)) ∪ {b(a∗, S)} ⊆
⋃
a∈A\{a1}
D(a, b(a, S ∪ {b(a∗, S)})),
by the induction hypothesis. As already stated, the reverse inclusion relationship is always true
and hence S ∪ {b(a∗, S)} ∈ ∆.
Consequently from Lemma 1, each state in Vdp admits two possible representations that we
call agent representation and item representation. In the item representation, a state (k, S) is
represented by a vector of size m + 1, i.e., S is represented by a binary vector of size m. In
the agent representation, a state (k, S) is represented by a vector of size n. In this case, S
is replaced by the vector (b(a2, S), . . . , b(an, S)). Note that processing a state (computing the
successor states and the optimal value of the state according to the ones of the successor states)
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in the agent (resp. item) representation can be done in O(nm) (resp. O(m)) operations. We
now show that the ManipSA problem can be solved in polynomial time for any bounded number
of agents.
Theorem 1. Problem ManipSA is solvable in O(n · mn+1). As a result, ManipSA is in XP
w.r.t. parameter n.
Proof. The result follows from the fact that our dynamic programming scheme runs in O(n ·
mn+1). To obtain this complexity bound, one should use the agent representation. In this case,
processing a state requires O(nm) operations, and one can use a dynamic programming table
of size mn with one cell per possible vector (k, b(a2, S), . . . , b(an, S)).
We now argue that our dynamic programming approach yields an FPT algorithm w.r.t.
parameters n+ µ(a1), n+ rg
max and rgmax by providing tighter upper bounds on |Sdp|. To use
these bounds, we will need the two following lemmata:
Lemma 2. Under the item representation, the graph Gdp can be build in O(m|Vdp|
2).
Proof. First note that Gdp is indeed acyclic. Indeed, given a state that can occur at time step t
of the allocation process (i.e., k+ |S| = t), its successors will either correspond to time step t+1
or will still correspond to time step t but with a strictly lower value for parameter k. We now
show how to incrementally build Gdp from state (k = 0, S = ∅). For each new state generated
at the previous iteration, compute its successor states, add edges towards them, and label them
with the corresponding utility values. Moreover, each time a state is generated, compare it to
the states already generated to avoid the creation of duplicates. If it is indeed a new state, its
successors will be computed in the next iteration. This process is repeated until all states are
generated. Note that because each state is only processed once, we will generate at most 2|Vdp|
states. However, because of the duplicate removal operation performed each time a state is
generated, the method runs in O(m|Vdp|
2). Indeed, this step will trigger O(|Vdp|
2) comparisons,
each requiring m+ 1 operations.
Lemma 3. Under the item representation, problem ManipSA can be solved in O(m|Vdp|
2).
Proof. By Lemma 2, we can build Gdp in O(m|Vdp|
2) and compute an optimal manipulation by
backward induction in O(m|Vdp|).
The algorithm is FPT w.r.t. parameter n + µ(a1). We further argue that |Sdp| can be
upper bounded by m(µ(a1)+1)
n−1. This is a consequence of the following lemma, where µ(a, t)
denotes the number of items that agent a gets to pick within the t first time steps.
Lemma 4. For each time step t, there is a set St of t − µ(a1, t) items that are always picked
within the t first time steps, whatever the actions of the manipulator.
Sketch of the proof. Given an instance J of the ManipSA problem, consider the instance J −a1
obtained from J by removing a1. Moreover, let us denote by S
−a1
t the set of items picked at
the end of the tth time step in J −a1 . This set of size t is clearly defined as all agents behave
truthfully in J −a1 . We argue that after t time steps in J , all items in S−a1
t−µ(a1,t)
have been
picked whatever the actions of a1. This can be showed by induction because at each time step
where the picker is a non-manipulator, she will pick the same item as in J −a1 unless this item
has already been picked.
As a consequence of Lemma 4, for each possible set S that can appear at time step t and
agent a ∈ A \ {a1}, b(a, S) can only be µ(a1, t − 1) + 1 different items. More precisely, b(a, S)
has to be one of the µ(a1, t − 1) + 1 preferred items of a in I \ St−1. As a result, the number
of possible vectors (b(a2, S), . . . , b(an, S)) associated to all the possible sets S that can appear
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at time step t is upper bounded by (µ(a1, t − 1) + 1)
n−1. Lastly, by using the facts that each
set S ∈ Sdp is characterized by the vector (b(a2, S), . . . , b(an, S)), that µ(a1, t) ≤ µ(a1) for all t,
and by considering all possible time steps, we obtain that |Sdp| ≤ m(µ(a1) + 1)
n−1.
Theorem 2. Problem ManipSA is solvable in O(m3(µ(a1) + 1)
2n). As a result, ManipSA is
FPT w.r.t. parameter n+ µ(a1).
Proof. This result is a consequence of Lemma 3 and the fact that |Vdp| ≤ (µ(a1) + 1)|Sdp| ≤
m(µ(a1) + 1)
n.
The algorithm is FPT w.r.t. parameter n + rgmax. We show that |Sdp| is also upper
bounded by m(2rgmax)n−2. This is a consequence of the following lemma.
Lemma 5. For any set S ⊆ I, and any two agents as, at ∈ A \ {a1},
|rkas(b(as, S))− rkat(b(at, S))| ≤ rg
max − 1.
Proof. If we assume for the sake of contradiction that rkas(b(as, S)) ≥ rkat(b(at, S)) + rg
max
and use the fact that |rkas(b(at, S)) − rkat(b(at, S))| < rg
max (by definition of rgmax), then we
can conclude that b(at, S) ≻as b(as, S), which contradicts the definition of b(as, S).
Lemma 5 implies that for each of the m possible items for b(a2, S), there are only 2rg
max−1
possible items for other parameters b(aj , S) with j > 2. Then, by using the facts that a set S ∈
Sdp is characterized by the vector (b(a2, S), . . . , b(an, S)), we obtain that Sdp ≤ m(2rg
max)n−2.
Theorem 3. Problem ManipSA is solvable in O(m5(2rgmax)2(n−2)). As a result, ManipSA is
FPT w.r.t. parameter n+ rgmax.
Proof. This result is a consequence of Lemma 3 and the fact that |Vdp| ≤ m|Sdp| ≤ m
2(2rgmax)n−2.
The algorithm is FPT w.r.t. parameter rgmax. Lastly, |Sdp| can also be upper bounded
by m22rg
max
. This claim is due to the fact that the set S \ D(a2, b(a2, S)) cannot contain an
item whose rank w.r.t. a2 is “too high”, which is proved in the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Given S ∈ Sdp, all i in S \D(a2, b(a2, S)) verify
rka2(b(a2, S)) + 1 ≤ rka2(i) ≤ rka2(b(a2, S)) + 2rg
max.
Proof. First note that by definition b(a2, S) 6∈S (because b(a2, S)∈I \ S) and D(a2, b(a2, S))=
{i ∈ I|rka2(i) < rka2(b(a2, S))}. Hence, the first inequality of the lemma hold.
Let us assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists i∈S \D(a2, b(a2, S)) such that
rka2(i)> rka2(b(a2, S)) + 2rg
max. Because S belongs to ∆, we have that S \D(a2, b(a2, S)) =⋃
a∈A\{a1}
D(a, b(a, S)) \ D(a2, b(a2, S)). Hence, there exists aj with j ≥ 3 such that i ∈
D(aj, b(aj , S)). By definition of rg
max, we have that rgmax > rka2(i) − rkaj (i), or equivalently
that rkaj (i) > rka2(i) − rg
max, which yields that rkaj (b(aj , S)) > rkaj (i) > rka2(i) − rg
max >
rka2(b(a2, S)) + rg
max. This contradicts Lemma 5.
As a consequence of Lemma 6, |Sdp| is upper bounded by m2
2rgmax because there are at most
m possible items for b(a2, S), and for each of them, there are at most 2
2rgmax possible sets for
S \D(a2, b(a2, S)).
Theorem 4. Problem ManipSA is solvable in O(m524rg
max
). As a result, ManipSA is FPT
w.r.t. parameter rgmax.
Proof. This result is a consequence of Lemma 3 and the fact that |Vdp| ≤ m|Sdp| ≤ m
222rg
max
.
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Remark. Note that it is easy to prove that, in contrast, the problem is NP-hard even if the
average range of the items is of 2.1 Furthermore, Theorem 3 might seem less appealing as the
ManipSA problem is FPT w.r.t. parameter rgmax alone. However, we would like to stress that
the time complexity of Theorem 3 might be more interesting than the one of Theorem 4 for a
small number of agents.
4 Hardness Results on the ManipSA Problem
We have seen in the last section that the ManipSA problem is in XP w.r.t. parameters n and
µ(a1) and that it is in FPT for parameter rg
max. One could hope for more positive results
for parameters n and µ(a1), as an FPT algorithm. However, we show in this section that the
ManipSA problem is W[1]-hard w.r.t. each of these two parameters.
We start with the hardness result on parameter µ(a1). In fact, we obtain a stronger result
by proving that even determining if there exists a successfully manipulation is W[1]-hard w.r.t.
µmax. Note that, by definition, µmax is greater than or equal to µ(a1).
Theorem 5. Determining if there exists a successful manipulation for a1 is W[1]-hard w.r.t.
parameter µmax.
Proof. We make a parameterized reduction from the CLIQUE problem where given a graph
G = (V,E) and an integer k, we wish to determine if there exists a clique of size k. This prob-
lem is W[1]-hard w.r.t. parameter k. W.l.o.g., we make the assumptions that |V | > k and that
|E| > k(k − 1)/2 (because otherwise it is trivial to determine if there is a clique of size k).
From an instance of CLIQUE, we create the following ManipSA instance.
Set of items. We create two items, g{i,j} (a good item) and w{i,j} (one of the worst items),
for each edge {i, j} ∈ E and two items, bi (one of the best items) and mi (a medium item),
for each vertex i ∈ V . Put another way, I = {g{i,j}, w{i,j}|{i, j} ∈ E} ∪ {bi,mi|i ∈ V } and the
number of items is thus |I| = 2|V |+ 2|E|.
Set of agents. We create one agent e{i,j} for each edge {i, j} ∈ E and one agent vi for
each vertex i ∈ V . The top of e{i,j}’s ranking is g{i,j} ≻ mi ≻ mj ≻ w{i,j} (which one of
mi or mj is ranked first can be chosen arbitrarily). The top of vi’s ranking is bi ≻ mi . We
also create |V | − k − 1 agents ct for t ∈ {1, . . . , |V | − k − 1} (whose role is to collect medium
items) such that the top of the ranking of each ct is m1 ≻ m2 . . . ≻ m|V |. Last, the manip-
ulator, that we denote by a1 to be consistent with the rest of the paper, has the following
preferences: he first ranks items bi, then items g{i,j}, then items mi and last items w{i,j}. To
summarize, A = {e{i,j}|{i, j} ∈ E} ∪ {vi|i ∈ V } ∪ {ct|t ∈ {1, . . . , |V | − k − 1}} ∪ {a1} and there
are |A| = 2|V |+ |E| − k agents.
Picking sequence. The picking sequence π is composed of the following rounds:
• Manipulator round 1: a1 gets to pick k items.
• Vertex round: each agent vi gets to pick one item.
• Manipulator round 2: a1 gets to pick k(k − 1)/2 items.
• Edge round: each agent e{i,j} gets to pick one item.
1 One can use a reduction with a sufficiently large number of dummy items ranked last and in the same
positions by all agents.
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• Medium item collectors round: each agent ct gets to pick one item.
• Manipulator round 3: a1 gets to pick one item.
• End round: the remaining items can be shared arbitrarily within the non-manipulators
such that each of them gets at most one new item.
Note that µmax = µ(a1) =
k(k+1)
2 + 1.
Utility values of a1. For ease of presentation, we will act as if there were only four different
utility values, even if a1 is asked to report a complete preference order. One can remove this
assumption, making preferences strict, by using sufficiently small ǫ values. In this sketch of
proof, each item bi has utility 4. Each item g{i,j} has utility 3. Each item mi has utility 2.
Lastly, items w{i,j} have utility 1. In this simplified setting, we set ≻T as being one specific
ranking consistent with the utility values of a1 and we wish to determine if there exists another
ranking yielding a strictly higher utility.
Sketch of the proof. At the end of the vertex round, all the best items are gone, as they
have already been picked by a1 or by the vertex agents vi. Similarly, at the end of the edge
round, none of the good items are left. Hence, at the third manipulator round, when a1 picks
her last item, the best she can hope for is a medium item. Consequently, the maximum utility
she might achieve is accomplished by picking k best items in her first round, k(k − 1)/2 good
items in her second round, and finally a medium item in her third round, for an overall utility of
4k+3k(k−1)/2+2. Note that she can always pick any set of k best items in her first round and
then (whatever the previous k best items) pick any set of k(k − 1)/2 good items in her second
round. Hence obtaining an overall utility of 4k + 3k(k − 1)/2 + 1 is always possible. Note also
that, if {bi1 , . . . , bik} are the k best items selected by a1 at the first round, then in the vertex
round the vertex agents {vi1 , . . . , vik} will pick the medium items {mi1 , . . . ,mik}. Moreover,
before the third manipulator round, agents ct will pick additional |V | − k − 1 medium items.
So, a medium item is left at the third manipulator round only if none of the edge agents picks
a medium item in the edge round. According to her preference ranking, any such agent e{i,j}
will not pick a medium item iff g{i,j} is still available, or if g{i,j}, mi and mj have all already
been picked. If g{i,j} is one of the k(k − 1)/2 good items that have been already picked at the
manipulator second round, then mi and mj have already been picked before by vi and vj in
the vertex round, if bi and bj were already taken in the first manipulator round. In conclusion,
none of the medium items are picked by the edge agents iff the k(k − 1)/2 edges e{i,j} for
which g{i,j} has already been picked at the second manipulator round have as endpoints only
nodes in {vi1 , . . . , vik}, and this is possible iff {vi1 , . . . , vik} forms a clique in the initial graph G.
Summarizing, there exists a strategy for a1 achieving an overall utility of 4k + 3k(k − 1)/2 + 2
iff G has a clique of k nodes. It remains to show that we could solve the CLIQUE problem if we
could determine if there exists a successful manipulation. This fact results from the following
disjunction of two cases: If uT = 4k+3k(k − 1)/2 + 2, then we can conclude that there exists a
clique of size k; Otherwise, if uT = 4k + 3k(k − 1)/2 + 1, then there exists a clique of size k iff
there exists a successful manipulation for a1.
Remark: Aziz et al. [ABLM17] considered a sequential allocation setting in which the ma-
nipulator has a binary utility function but is asked to provide a complete preference order. In
this setting, the manipulation problem consists in finding a ranking maximizing the utility of
the bundle she gets. While the authors showed that this problem can be solved in polynomial
time, the reduction used in the sketch of the proof of Theorem 5 shows that this problem is
NP-hard if the manipulator has a utility function involving four different values (instead of two).
Similarly, we obtain that the ManipSA problem is W[1]-hard w.r.t. the number of agents.
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Theorem 6. ManipSA is W[1]-hard w.r.t. the number of agents.
Proof. We design a parameterized reduction from MULTICOLORED CLIQUE. In this problem,
given a graph G = (V,E) with vertex set V = {v1, . . . , vn}, an integer k, and a vertex coloring
φ : V → {1, . . . , k}, we wish to determine if there exists a clique of size k in G containing exactly
one vertex per color. MULTICOLORED CLIQUE is known to be W[1]-hard w.r.t. parameter
k [FHRV09].
Idea of the proof : We resort on the nice mathematical tool of Sidon sequences. These se-
quences associate to each number i in {1, . . . , n} a value id(i) such that, for every pair (i, l) with
i ≤ l, the sum id(i) + id(l) is different from the one of any other different pair of elements in
{1, . . . , n}. We use the construction of Erdo¨s and Tura`n [ET41], by setting id(i) = 2pi + (i2
mod p) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where p is the smallest prime number greater than n. Notice
that, by the Bertrand-Chebyshev theorem [Che52], p < 2n, and thus id(i) = O(n2). This se-
quence will be used in the following way. We create a large set of items Bj for each color j. In
the first picking round, the manipulator will be able to pick a large number of items within these
sets. To recover a solution of the MULTICOLORED CLIQUE problem, we will show that, if a
multicolored clique {vi1 , . . . , vik} exists in which each vertex vij has color φ(vij ) = j, then in an
optimal manipulation the manipulator should pick exactly (k + 1) · id(ij) items in each set Bj .
The edges of the clique will then be identified by the sums id(ij)+ id(ir) for all pairs of vertices
{vij , vir} ⊂ {vi1 , . . . , vik}.
From a MULTICOLORED CLIQUE instance (G = (V,E), k, φ), we construct the following
ManipSA instance.
Set of items:
• For each color j, we create a set Bj of (k + 1) · id(n) items, and two sets Idj and Idj of
id(n) + 2 items each. The purpose of items in Idj ∪ Idj is to ensure that the number of
items picked by a1 in Bj is of the form (k + 1) · id(i) such that φ(vi) = j.
• For each pair of colors {j, r} with j 6= r, we create a set Id{j,r} of 2 · (id(n) + 1) items.
The purpose of items in Id{j,r} is to ensure that, whenever a1 picks (k+1) · id(i) items in
Bj and (k + 1) · id(l) items in Br for two given vertices vi and vl of colors φ(vi) = j and
φ(vl) = r, then {vi, vl} is an edge of G.
• We create a set D of k(k + 1) · id(n) items. In a first picking round, the manipulator will
be able to pick items in
⋃k
j=1Bj ∪D. The purpose of items in D is to make it possible for
a1 to adjust the number of items she picks in
⋃k
j=1Bj .
• Last, we add a set Z of 2k(k+1)id(n) items. Set Z will be used as a buffer of items where
each non-manipulator will pick when no items in Idj , Idj , or Idj,r are left, so as to avoid
mutual conflicts.
Set of agents: We create two agents cj and cj per color j, and two agents pj,r and pr,j for
each pair of colors {j, r} such that j 6= r. Moreover, we create one agent denoted by d and one
manipulator a1. In total, there are k(k+1)+ 2 agents. We now detail the top of the preference
rankings of non-manipulators, where by abuse of notations, we use S ≻ S′ to denote the fact
that items in S are ranked before the ones in S′, while the order inside each set is indifferent.
• Agent cj, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k: Bj ≻ Idj ≻ Z ≻ . . ..
• Agent cj, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k: Bj ≻ Idj ≻ Z ≻ . . ..
• Agent pj,r, for 1 ≤ j 6= r ≤ k: Bj ≻ Id{j,r} ≻ Z ≻ . . . .
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• Agent pr,j for 1 ≤ j 6= r ≤ k: Br ≻ Id{j,r} ≻ Z ≻ . . . .
• Agent d: D ≻ Z ≻ . . ..
As an important remark, notice that agents pj,r and pr,j rank items in Id{j,r} identically.
Picking sequence: π is composed of the following rounds:
• Manipulator round 1: a1 gets to pick k(k + 1) · id(n) items.
• Non-manipulators round:
– Agents in A \ {a1, d} pick in id(n) subrounds. In each subround, each of them picks
exactly one item in the following order: agents cj , 1 ≤ j ≤ k, are the first pickers,
then come agents pj,r, and lastly agents cj.
– Finally, agent d picks k(k + 1) · id(n) items.
• Manipulator round 2: a1 gets all remaining items.
Utility values of a1: For ease of presentation, we use two simplifying assumptions. First, we
act as if different items can have the same utility value for a1. This assumption can be removed
making preferences strict by adding sufficiently small ǫ values. Second, we use negative utilities.
In fact, one can recover an equivalent instance with only non-negative values by adding to all
the utilities the absolute value of the minimal one. Indeed, this would not change the set of
optimal solutions as the size of a1’s bundle is fixed by π.
• Items in Z have a utility value of 0.
• One specific item in each set Bj, that we denote by b
∗
j , has a utility value of 4α where
α = (id(n)+2)k(k+1). All items in (
⋃k
j=1Bj ∪D)\{b
∗
1, . . . , b
∗
k} have a utility value equal
to 2α.
• The utilities of the items in the sets Idj and Idj are defined as follows. Index the items
in Idj (resp. Idj) from 1 to id(n) + 2 according to the preference order of agent cj (resp.
cj). Furthermore, let Tj = {id(i)|φ(vi) = j}, τj(t) denote the t
th smallest value in Tj,
and Tj = |Tj|. We also set τj(0) = 0 and τj(Tj + 1) = id(n) + 2. Then, all items receive
a utility value of 1, except for the items of indices τj(t) for t ∈ {1, . . . , Tj + 1}, that get
utility τj(t− 1)− τj(t) + 1. Notice that, for every t such that 1 ≤ t ≤ Tj +1, by definition
the sum of the utilities of all the items from τj(t− 1) + 1 to τj(t) is 0.
• Similarly, the utilities of the items in each Id{j,r} are set in the following manner. Index
these items from 1 to 2id(n) + 2 according to the preference order of agents pj,r and
pr,j. Furthermore, let Tj,r = {id(i) + id(l)|φ(vi) = j, φ(vl) = r, {vi, vl} ∈ E}, τj,r(t)
denote the tth smallest value in Tj,r, and Tj,r = |Tj,r|. We also set τj,r(0) = 0 and
τj,r(Tj,r + 1) = 2id(n) + 2. Then all items receive a utility value of 1, except items of
index τj,r(t) for t ∈ {1, . . . , Tj,r + 1}, whose utility is set to τj,r(t− 1)− τj,r(t) + 1.
As we are going to show below, in an optimal manipulation, the agents behave as follows.
In the first manipulator round, a1 picks k(k + 1) · id(n) items in
⋃
j Bj ∪ D. Then, in the
non-manipulators round, agents cj , pj,r and cj for the different values j and r 6= j pick the
remaining items in the sets Bj, plus other items in Idj , Idj and Id{j,r}. Subsequently, d takes
all the remaining items in D and further ones to complete her picks in Z. Finally, in the second
manipulator round, a1 collects all remaining items.
Sketch of the proof. We first claim that, in the first manipulator round, a1 should pick
only items in
⋃
j Bj ∪ D. Indeed, after the non-manipulators round, none of these items is
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left, whatever a1 has previously picked. In particular, the items left by a1 in each set Bj are
collected by agents cj , pj,r and cj , while the ones in D are collected by agent d. Moreover,
because |
⋃
j(Idj ∪ Idj) ∪
⋃
j 6=r Idj,r| is upper bounded by α and of the utility function we have
set, any subset of items in I \ (
⋃
j Bj ∪ D) as a utility value which is strictly less than α and
strictly greater than −α. As a result, because each item in
⋃
j Bj ∪D is worth 2α, any solution
which would not pick only items in
⋃
j Bj ∪D in the first manipulator round could be improved
by doing so. Using the same type of argument, we also claim that a1 should pick all of the b
∗
j
items in her first picking round. We will hence restrict our attention to picking strategies that
verify these two assumptions. Under such an hypothesis, the best utility value a1 can hope to
get from the set of items she collects in her second picking round is 0. This is induced by the
utility values that we have set, as well as by the truthful picking strategies of non-manipulators.
Indeed, note that by construction the overall utility of the set I \ (
⋃
j Bj ∪D) is 0. Moreover,
as sets Idj , Idj and Id{j,r} are indexed according to the preference orders of agents cj, cj, pj,r
and pr,j, at the end of the non-manipulators round only prefixes of such sets have been picked.
Hence, recalling that all the items in Z have null utility for a1, the overall utility of items left
to a1 at the beginning of the second manipulator round is 0 if and only if the prefixes of the
already picked items in all the sets Idj , Idj and Id{j,r} end up to items of negative value for a1.
We now argue that this can happen if and only if there exists a multicolored clique G.
Let us first show the only if direction, i.e., that if a1 gets an overall utility equal to 0 from
the set of items she collects in her second picking round, then there is a multicolored clique of
size k in G. Let us denote by nbj the number of items that a1 has picked in Bj during the first
manipulator round. Since for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k} agent a1 has picked b
∗
j and |Bj| = (k+1)id(n),
we have that 1 ≤ nbj ≤ (k + 1)id(n). We first show that nbj should be a multiple of k + 1.
To this aim, let us first observe that, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, after the first manipulator
round, in every non-manipulators subround, k + 1 items of Bj (if still available) are picked by
the k + 1 agents cj, pj,r with j 6= r and cj (in this order). Therefore, at the end of the non-
manipulators rounds, cj has picked ⌊nbj/(k + 1)⌋ items in Idj and cj has picked ⌈nbj/(k + 1)⌉
items in Idj . But then, if nbj is not a multiple of k+1, these two numbers are different and thus
the last items picked by cj in Id(j) and by cj in Idj cannot both have negative utility for a1,
because the difference between two consecutive id values is strictly greater than 1. Therefore,
each nbj should be of the form nbj = (k+1) · id(ij ) for some ij ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that φ(vij ) = j,
so that both cj and cj pick id(ij) items in Idj and Idj , respectively. In order to show that
{vij |1 ≤ j ≤ k} is a multicolored clique, it remains to prove that all the vertices of this set are
neighbors in G. Indeed, since in each subround of the non-manipulators round every time cj
picks in Id(j) each agent pj,r picks in Id{j,r}, at the end of the non-manipulators round pj,r and
pr,j have picked id(ij) + id(ir) items in Id{j,r}. Since in order for a1 to achieve an overall utility
equal to 0 in the second manipulator round the last item previously picked in Id{j,r} must have
a negative utility, {vij , vir} must be an edge of G.
It remains to show the if direction, i.e., that if there is a multicolored clique {vi1 , . . . , vik} in
G, then there exists a strategy leading a1 to reach overall utility 0 in her second manipulation
round. Assuming without loss of generality that φ(vlj ) = j, this can be accomplished by letting
a1 pick nbj = (k + 1) · id(ij) items in Bj, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, and the remaining items in D. Then,
each cj (resp. cj) will pick id(ij) items in Id(j) (resp. Idj) and each pj,r will pick id(ij) items
in Id{j,r}, which causes a1 to achieve overall utility 0 in her second manipulator round, finally
proving the claim.
Consequently from Theorems 5 and 6, it is unlikely that the ManipSA problem admits FPT
algorithms w.r.t. parameters µ(a1) and n. Hence, these results valorize the XP results on these
parameters obtained in Section 3, as well as Theorem 2, which interestingly shows that the
ManipSA problem is FPT w.r.t. parameter µ(a1) + n.
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5 An Upper Bound on the Optimal Value of ManipSA
Our initial hope was that computational complexity could be a barrier to manipulating sequential
allocation. Unfortunately, we have seen in Section 3 that the ManipSA problem can be solved
efficiently for several subclasses of instances. Another reason that could push agents towards
behaving truthfully could be that it would not be worth it. Indeed, if the increase in utility that
an agent can get by manipulating is very low, she might be reluctant to gather the necessary
information and do the effort of looking for a good manipulation. We provide the following tight
bound on this issue.
Theorem 7. The manipulator cannot increase her welfare by a factor greater than or equal to
2, i.e., max≻ u(φ≻(a1)) < 2uT and this bound is tight.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the value of parameter µ(a1). If µ(a1) = 1, the bound is
obvious because a1 cannot manipulate. If µ(a1) = 2, the bound is also easy to prove because
a1 will obtain only two items and the utility of each of them cannot be greater than the one
of the first item a1 picks when behaving truthfully, one having a strictly lower utility. Note
that uT > 0 when µ(a1) ≥ 2. Let us assume the bound true up to µ(a1) = k − 1 and let us
further assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists an instance J with µ(a1) = k
where max≻ u(φ≻(a1)) ≥ 2uT . Moreover, let us denote by x1, . . . , xk (resp. y1, . . . , yk) the items
picked by a1 when behaving truthfully (resp. according to one of her best manipulation that we
denote by ≻b), where the items are ordered w.r.t. the time step at which they are picked (e.g.,
x1 is picked first when a1 behaves truthfully). Our hypothesis implies that:
k∑
i=1
u(yi) ≥ 2
k∑
i=1
u(xi) = 2uT . (4)
We will now show how to build from J an instance J ′′ with µ(a1) = k − 1 and where
max≻ u(φ≻(a1)) ≥ 2uT , hence bringing a contradiction. However, for ease of presentation this
construction is decomposed into two parts: a first one where we work on an instance J ′ obtained
from J ; and a second one where we analyse the desired instance J ′′ which is obtained from J ′.
Part 1: Consider the instance J ′ obtained from J by removing the first occurrence of a1 in
π (an arbitrary non-manipulator is added at the end of π so that the length of π remains m). We
denote by t1 this particular time step, i.e., the one of the first occurrence of a1 in π. We point
out that in J ′, the manipulator can manipulate to obtain the set of items y2, . . . , yk. Indeed,
assume w.l.o.g. that items y1, . . . , yk are ranked first in ≻b (not necessarily in that order) and
let ≻↓y1b be the ranking obtained from ≻b by putting y1 in last position. Furthermore, let S
J
t
(resp. SJ
′
t ) be the set of items picked at the end of time step t in instances J (resp. J
′) when
a1 follows strategy ≻b (resp. ≻
↓y1
b ). Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 7. SJ
′
t = S
J
t for t < t
1 and SJ
′
t ⊆ S
J
t+1 for t ≥ t
1.
Proof of Lemma 7. The first part of the lemma is obvious because the picking processes in J and
J ′ are identical for t < t1. We prove the second part of the lemma by induction. Let us denote
by πJ (t) (resp. πJ ′(t)) the picker at time step t in instance J (resp. J
′). Then for all t ≥ t1,
we have that πJ ′(t) = πJ (t + 1). Then, S
J ′
t ⊆ S
J
t+1 is true for t = t
1 because SJ
′
t1−1
= SJ
t1−1
,
SJ
t1
= SJ
t1−1
∪{y1}, and hence the only item that πJ ′(t
1) could prefer to the one πJ (t
1+1) picks
is y1. Let us assume the inclusion relationship true up to t = l. So S
J
l+1 = S
J ′
l ∪ {i}, where i
is some item. Then, we obtain that SJ
′
l+1 ⊆ S
J
l+2, because the only item that πJ ′(l + 1) could
prefer to the one πJ (l + 2) picks is item i.
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A direct consequence of Lemma 7, ≻↓y1b is successful in picking items y2, . . . , yk in J
′.
Part 2: Let us now consider the instance J ′′ obtained from J ′ by removing x1 from the
set of items as well as the last agent in the picking sequence (that we had artificially added in
the first part of the proof). In J ′′ the set of items that a1 gets when behaving truthfully is
x2, . . . , xk. Consider the preference ranking ≻
↓y1,−x1
b obtained from ≻
↓y1
b by removing x1 and
denote by SJ
′′
t the set of items picked at the end of time step t in J
′′ when a1 follows strategy
≻↓y1,−x0b . Moreover, let t
l (resp. t1) be the time step in J ′ at which a1 picks yl (resp. at which
x1 is picked by some agent) when a1 uses strategy ≻
↓y1
b where 2 ≤ l ≤ k. We show that a1 can
get in J ′′ a set of items Y compounded of all items in {y2, . . . , yk} up to one item. This is a
consequence of the following lemma.
Lemma 8. SJ
′′
t = S
J ′
t for t < t
1 and SJ
′′
t is of the form (S
J ′
t \ {x1}) ∪ {i} for t ≥ t
1 where i
is some item in I.
Proof of Lemma 8. The first part of the lemma is obvious because the picking processes in J ′
and J ′′ are identical for t < t1. We prove the second part of the lemma by induction. Let us
denote by πJ ′(t) (resp. πJ ′′(t)) the picker at time step t in instance J
′ (resp. J ′′). Then for all t,
we have that πJ ′(t) = πJ ′′(t). Then, the fact that S
J ′′
t1
is of the form (SJ
′
t1
\{x1})∪{i} is just due
to the fact that SJ
′
t1−1
= SJ
′′
t1−1
. Let us assume this fact true up to t = l. So SJ
′′
l = S
J ′
l \{x1}∪{i},
where i is some item. We obtain that SJ
′′
l+1 is of the form S
J ′
l \{x1}∪{i
′}, where i′ is some item,
because πJ ′′(l + 1) will pick the same item as πJ ′(l + 1) except if this item is i.
Let j be the first index in J ′′ (if any) such that a1 cannot pick yj at t
j ≥ t1. Then, by
Lemma 8, we have that SJ
′′
t = (S
J ′
t \ {x1}) ∪ {yl+1} for t
j ≤ tl ≤ t < tl+1. This is due to the
fact that ≻↓y1b is successful in picking items y2, . . . , yk in J
′ and this proves the claim that a1
can get a set of items Y compounded of all items in {y2, . . . , yk} up to one item. Hence,
∑
y∈Y
u(y) ≥
k∑
i=1
u(yi)− u(y1)− max
2≤j≤k
u(yj)
≥ 2
k∑
i=1
u(xi)− u(y1)− max
2≤j≤k
u(yj)
≥ 2
k∑
i=2
u(xi)
where the second inequality is due to Inequality 4 and the third one is due to fact that u(yi) ≤
u(x1),∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. We obtain a contradiction because µ(a1) = k − 1 in J
′′.
The tightness of the bound is provided by the instance of Example 1 with the following
utility function u(i1) = u(i2) + ǫ = u(i3) + 2ǫ = 1 and u(i4) = 0. We recall that in this
instance uT = u(i1) + u(i4) = u(i1) whereas the manipulator can obtain by manipulating the
set S = {i2, i3} with utility u(i2) + u(i3) = 2u(i1)− 3ǫ.
We conclude from Theorem 7 that, while the increase in utility of the manipulator cannot
be arbitrarily large, manipulating may often be worth it for the manipulator as doubling her
utility can be a significant improvement.
6 An Integer Programming Formulation
In this last section, we provide an integer programming formulation of the ManipSA problem.
This integer program provides another tool than the dynamic programming algorithm of Sec-
tion 3 to solve the ManipSA problem which may be more efficient for some instances. Moreover,
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a more thorough analysis of this formulation and of it’s solution polytope may lead to new
results. For instance, some bounds on the number of variables could yield new parameterized
complexity results via Lenstra’s theorem [Jr.83].
By abuse of notation, we will identify the set I as the set [m] = {1, . . . ,m}. Let xit be a
binary variable with the following meaning: xit = 1 iff item i is picked at time step t. Then,
the constraint
∑m
i=1 xit = 1 implies that there is exactly one item being picked at time step t.
Similarly, the constraint
∑m
t=1 xit = 1 implies that item i is picked at exactly one time step.
Lastly, consider a time step t such that π(t) 6= a1. Then the following set of constraints implies
that π(t) picks at time step t the best item available for her.
xit +
∑
j≻pi(t)i
xjt +
∑
t′<t
xit′ ≥ 1, ∀i ∈ [m]
In words, this constraint says that: if π(t) does not pick item i at time step t (i.e., xit = 0),
it is either because she picks something that she prefers (i.e.,
∑
j≻pi(t)i
xjt = 1 ), or because
item i has already been picked at an earlier time step (i.e.,
∑
t′<t xit′ = 1). To summarize, we
obtain the following integer programming formulation2 with m2 binary variables and at most
m2 constraints (as we can assume the manipulator is the picker for at least two time steps),
max
xit
m∑
i=1
∑
t:pi(t)=a1
xitu(i)
s.t.
m∑
t=1
xit = 1, ∀i ∈ [m]
m∑
i=1
xit = 1, ∀t ∈ [m]
xit +
∑
j≻pi(t)i
xjt +
∑
t′<t
xit′ ≥ 1, ∀i, t ∈ [m]
2 s.t. π(t) 6= a1
xit ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, t ∈ [m]
2
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have provided a variety of results on the problem of finding an optimal manipulation in the
sequential allocation protocol. Beside an integer program to solve this problem, we have designed
a dynamic programming algorithm from which we have derived several positive parameterized
complexity results. For instance, we have shown that this manipulation problem is in XP with
respect to the number of agents and that it is in FPT with respect to the maximum range of an
item. Conversely, we have also provided matching W[1]-hardness results. Lastly, motivated by
the fact that agents could be inclined to behave truthfully if a manipulation would not be worth
it, we have investigated an upper bound on the increase in utility that the manipulator could
get by manipulating. We have showed that the manipulator cannot increase the utility of her
bundle by a factor greater than or equal to 2 and that this bound is tight. Overall, our results
show that, not only sequential allocations are worth manipulating, but also that they can be
manipulated efficiently for a wide range of instances.
Several directions for future work are conceivable. One could try to decrease our upper bound
on the increase in utility that the manipulator can obtain by restricting to specific instances (e.g.,
imposing a specific type of picking sequences). Moreover, it would be worth investigating the
2We note that we obtain an integer programming formulation which is very close to one of the mathematical
program used to solve stable marriage problems [GI89].
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price of manipulation, i.e., the worst case ratio between the social welfare when one agent ma-
nipulates, all the others being truthful, and the one when all the agents behave truthfully. On
this issue, to the best of our knowledge, little is known except for some preliminary results by
Bouveret and Lang [BL14].
Acknowledgments. We are grateful to Je´roˆme Lang and Paolo Serafino for helpful com-
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